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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL FINANCE 
COMPANY OF UTAH 
Plaintiff ~and Respondent, 
vs. 
CARLOS J. VALDEZ 
Defendant ~and Appel,lant. 
Case No. 913'7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A re-statement of the facts appears necessary 
in some particulars. The defendant and his wife 
obtained a loan from the plaintiff in March 1957 
in the sum of $1920.00 and they executed a note 
and chattel mortgage as security, and at the same 
time the defendant Carlos J. Valdez, executed and 
delivered to the plaintiff a written statement con-
cerning his financial condition. That said financial 
statement purported to be and was represented to 
be a complete statement as to the said Carlos J. 
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Valdez's financiai condition on the date of the loan, 
to-wit, March 21, 195'7. 
The defendant Carlos J. Valdez filed a voluntary 
petition in bankruptcy in August 1957. Plaintiff 
filed su!t in November 1957 to foreclose the mort-
gage, and alleged in its complaint facts to indicate 
this liability was not affected by a bankruptcy dis-
ch·arge because i't was a liability founded upon false 
pretenses and false representations. The false pre-
tenses and false representations were set forth in 
detail. The defendant answered setting up as an af-
firm·ative defense the discharge in bankruptey of 
the 'defendant C·arlos J. Valdez. The case came on 
'for pre-tria:l at which time the prayer of plaintiff's 
complaint was amended 'to include the following: 
"That the court determine the claim herein sued 
upon be declared non-dischargeable in bankruptcy". 
The defendants stipulated for judgment against 
Rebecca ·M. Valdez, one of the defen·dants, and the 
Court at pre-trial after admissions by the parties 
found the only issues to be determined were; 1. 
Whether or not the court may under the pieadings 
as they are amended, find and enter an order tha't 
the obliga:tion in question was not dischargeable 
in view of the proVisinns of Section t7 -2 Federal 
Bankruptcy Act. Pre Trial Order 13. 
Wh.en the case came on for trial the defendant 
again raised the bankruptcy of the defendant Carlos 
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J. Valdez by motion to stay proceedings, and argued 
that the Plaintiff had misconceived its remedy. R-17. 
The Court's attention was called to the facts 
admitted at pre-trial - that the defendant Carlos 
J. Valdez prior to obtaining said loan and as an 
inducement to make said loan, submitted to plain-
tiff a written financial statement concerning his 
financial condition, that said financia1l statement 
purportedly was represented to be a complete state-
ment as to the said Carlos J. Valdez's financial 
condition on March 21, 1957. That he represented 
that he had no other debts than those aggregating 
$2500.00 with the effect of inducing said loan and 
the acceptance of said promissory note and chattel 
mortgage, whereas in truth and in fact, the defen-
dant Carlos J. Valdez knew he was indebted in an 
a1nount aggregating more than $3800.00. R-18 and 
19. 
Plaintiff offered to introduce evidence that the 
plaintiff relied upon the statement and did not know 
it was false and if it had known it was false, it 
would not have made the loan. The defendant then 
stated by Mr. Dibblee "I am stipu'lating, your Honor 
to the facts. Mr. Parkinson has sho\vn me the papers 
that my client signed and he has made an investiga-
tion". R-20. 
The facts stipulated were the facts alleged in 
plaintiff's complaint. That the defendant Carlos J. 
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Valdez secured the loan through a materially false 
statement in writing and that the defendant Carlos 
J. Valdez knew the statement was false, also that 
the plaintiff did not know the statement was fa1lse 
and that 'the plaintiff relied upon the s'tatement and 
if plaintiff had known the true facts, would not have 
made the loan. The case was submitted entirely on 
a poin't of law, to-wit: "The application of Section 




CERTAIN DEBTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY A DIS-
CHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY, AND THE LIABILITY 
OR OBLIGATI'ON TO PLAINTIFF IS ·ONE ·OF TH·OSE. 
P~OINT II 
'DHE EFFECT OF THE DISCHARGE IN BANK-
RUPTCY IS DETERMINED IN THE FORUM WHERE 
THE QUESTION ARISES. 
POINT III 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE DEFENDANT 
DO NOT JUSTIFY 'OR SUSTAIN HIS P·OSITION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CERTAIN DE'BTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY A DIS-
CHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY, AND THE LIABILITY 
OR OBLIGATrON TO PLAINTIFF IS ONE ·OF TH·OSE. 
There .are two secfions of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act bearing on the problem. Section 14 (11 
U.S. Code Annotated 3'2) while not directly involved 
is of interest to aid in distinguishing objections to 
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a discharge, from liabilities which are not affected 
by a discharge in bankruptcy. Under Section 14 ob-
jec't1ons to a discharge are made directly to the 
bankruptcy court and are part of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. Objections are fi'led by any appropriate 
party v1ho may be a creditor or other parties, or on 
occasion by the referee in bankruptcy. 
When objections are sustained, a discharge is 
denied and the bankrupt does not receive a discharge 
on any deb'ts, and all of bankrupt's liabilities remain 
in fuJI force and effect. There is no su-ch thing· as 
a split or partial discharge. Under 'this section a 
denial of a discharge is equally effective as to all 
debts and a rather serious penalty. However, even 
to 'the party who has committed no acts tha't would 
result in the denial of a dis-charge, Congress has 
provided that even so quite a number of classes of 
debts are not affected by the bankruptcy discharge 
even though these debts are properly 'listed and a 
discharge in bankruptcy is granted. 
It is the plaintiff's con'tention that the debt 
herein sued upon is one of those no't affected by a 
discharge in bankruptcy. The debts not affected by 
a discharge are set fotth in what is known as Sec-
tion 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S. Code 
Annotated 35) is as follovvs : 
"Sec. 17 Deb'ts Not Affected by a Dis-
charge. - a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall 
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release a b.ankrupt from all of his provable 
debts, except such as ( 1) are due as a tax 
levied by the United States, the State, county, 
district, or municipality in which he resides; 
( 2) are liabilities for obtaining property by 
false pretense or false representations, or for 
willfu1ll and malicious injuries to the person 
or property of another, or for alimony due or 
to become due, or for maintenance or support 
of wife or child, or for seduction of an un-
married female, or for breach of promise of 
marriage accompanied by seduction, or for 
criminal conversation; ( 3) have not been duly 
scheduled in time for proof and allowance, 
with the name of the creditor, if known to the 
bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or 
actual knowledge of the proceedings in bank-
ruptcy; or ( 4) were created by his fraud, em-
bezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation 
while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary 
capacity; or ( 5) are for wages due to work-
man, clerks, traveling or city salesmen, or 
servants, which have been earned within three 
months before the date of commencement of 
the proceedings in bankruptcy; or ( 6) are 
due for moneys of an employee received or re-
tained by his employer to secure the faithful 
performance by such employee of the terms 
of a contract of employment." 
This seetion provides that the liabilities therein 
set forth are not affecte·d by a discharge and co-n-
tinue exactly the same as though bankruptcy had 
not been taken. 
Bear in mind that a discharge in bankruptcy 
does not ipso facto set up some new or different 
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relationship, but only furnishes the bankrupt with 
a defense to the enforcement of existing obligations. 
Bankruptcy is a defense that must be pleaded and 
if not pleaded, it is waived. Bankruptcy does not 
wipe out the liabilities, but only gives the bankrupt 
a defense to their enforcement. The ~liability or obli-
gation continues and will support a new promise 
to pay without consideration. If one of the taxing 
uni'ts 1nentioned in Section 17, proceeds to enforce 
the liability to it, and a discharge in bankruptcy is 
pleaded as a defense1 a determination is made that 
this liability is one of those described in Section 17, 
and is not affected by the discharge. 
If a workman sues for wages and the discharge 
in bankruptcy is pleaded, the workman shows the 
vvages 'vere earned within three months prior to 
the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy 
and therefore the defense of bankruptcy does not 
apply. 
If an employee sues an employer for money and 
the employer in turn pleads bankruptcy, the em-
ployee meets the affirmative defense of bankruptcy 
by showing that the money he sues for was held by 
the employer to secure the faithful performance of 
the employee, and therefore the bankruptcy dis-
charge is not a good defense. 
When the defendant Valdez conducted his trans-
action with the plaintiff, a liability to that plaintiff 
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was estab~ished. If that liability was not affected 
by a discharge, then it remains the same as though 
bankruptcy had not been taken. 
In this case the plaintiff asserts a liability of 
the defendants and sets forth what he claims that 
liability to be, - this liability must be established 
and proved by the plaintiff. One of the defendants, 
Catlos J. Valdez, says ''Yes, tha:t is my liability but 
I have a defense. I am no longer bound by that 
liabili'ty because I have taken bankruptcy". Plain-
tiff then meets this affirmative defense by setting 
forth that the defendant made false representations 
to induce plaintiff to enter into this transaction and 
therefore this debt is not affected by a discharge in 
bankruptcy - the defense does ndt apply. 
The first question then is "What was the bank-
rupt's liabili'ty to this creditor?" If th.at liability is 
not affected by a discharge - then the liability is 
exactly the same as though bankruptcy had not 
occurred. The Bankruptcy Act, Section 17, does not 
create a new or different liability but only provides 
the existing liability is not affected a discharge. 
Therefore the plaintiff in seeking to enforce the 
liabili'ty must set it forth - first in order to deter-
mine what if any liability existed. This the plain-
tiff must do by setting forth the liability of the 
bankrupt to the plaintiff and in proving and estab-
lishing that liability, as though bankruptcy had 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
never occurred, but unless that liability was founded 
upon false pretenses and fa'lse representations, it 
would be affected by the discharge in bankruptcy. 
Therefore, after setting forth the details of the 
liability which if the court please, is and was the 
exac't liability set forth in the contract with the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff must then show why the 
discharge is not a bar to the enforcement of this 
liability. Were there no bankruptcy, I doubt if any-
one would argue differently. They would readily 
admit the bankrupt's liabili'ty was exactly what the 
agreement or contract said it was. If that liability 
is not affected by a discharge, then it remains the 
same - but to avoid the defense or bar 'to the en-
forcement of this liability the false pretenses and 
fa1se representations upon which that liability came 
into existanee, must be shown, not 'to crea'te a new 
or different cause of action, but to meet the affirm-
ative defense set up by the bankrupt. 
The discussion in many cases is that the false 
represen'ta'tions or false pretenses that must be 
shown (sometimes carelesly referred to as "fraud") 
is not in conflict with this theory but supports it. 
There are many cases to bear this out.. A care-
ful consideration and full understanding of 'the prob-
'lem properly presented to the court has never re-
sulted in a contrary decision. The case of Ohio Fin-
ance vs. Greatho~[se, 110 N.E. 2nd 805, is a concise, 
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direct and clear dis'cussion of this point. In tha't 
case a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff; and 
the defendant prosecuted his appeal on questions 
of law, much the same as the instant case. Quoting 
from the case, the Court stated: 
"The following questions material to a decision 
on this a ppea'l are :" 
"1. Did the discharge in bankruptcy re-
lieve the ·defendant from 'liability on the note 
set up in plaintiff's statement of claim, 'the 
execution of the ndte by defendant being ad-
mitted, his discharge in bankruptcy having 
been shown, wherein he listed this debt and 
gave notice to the plaintiff; who made no ob-
jection to the discharge in the bankruptcy 
court?. 
"2. Did the plaintiff misconceive its 
remedy and by filing its action on contract 
instead o ftor't, thereby prec'lude itself from 
pleading the defendant's tort by way of reply 
to the defendant's answer, setting up the dis-
charge in bankruptcy?" 
"3. Could plaintiff attack in the muni-
cipal court, the bankruptcy discharge, or was 
it required to seek relief in the bankruptcy 
cour.t to set aside such discharge on the ground 
of the alleged false pretenses and faise repre-
sentations of the defendant?" 
''We are of the opinion that the answers 
to all of 'these questions are no longer debate-
able in view of the express provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act and the several decisions of 
this court in which we follow the great weight 
of au'thori'ty throughout the United States. 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Alt of these questions must be answered fa-
vorably to the plaintiff appellee." 
The case of Argyle vs. J!acobs 87 N.Y. 110- 41 
A.R. 351, is one of the early land mark cases on 
this st1bject and in agreement with the above an-
alysis. rt has never been overruled. 
The above case is quoted at length in the case 
of Gregory vs. Williams 105 Kan. 819, 189 Pac. 
932 as follows: 
"Fraud was set up in the reply, not as a 
cause of action against the defendant but to 
avoid the defense that had been pleaded * * * 
the a~tion continues as an action on a prom-
issory note. The reply did not constitute a de-
parture from the cause of action alleged in 
the bill of particulars.'' 
In Crespi & Co. vs. Griffin 132 Calif. App 562 -
23 Pac. 2nd 47, we find 
"In the instant case, the obligation is on 
a promisory note, fraud was included and in-
ciden'tal 'to 'the creation of that obligation. 
That incident was properly urged without 
pleading to avoid the plea of a discharge in 
bankruptcy". 
Personal Finance of Waterbury vs. Robinson 
27 N.Y. Sup. 2nd 6 - the court stated the question 
was specifically passed upon in Argyle vs. Jacobs 
87 N.Y. 110-41 A.R. 357. 
''There as in 'the case a't bar, an ac'tion 
was brought upon a pomissory note and no 
fraud was alleged in the comp'laint. The an-
11 
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swer, as here, set up as an affirmative defense 
the discharge in bankruptcy. Upon the trial 
the plainfi'ff was permitted to give evidence 
tending to show that this debt was. created 
by fraud of a bankrupt, which was the word-
ing of the statute at that time. The Appellate 
court held this to be proper and affirmed 
the judgment for the plaintiff saying at page 
113-87 N.Y., "but it is further contended 
on the par't of the defendant's that the plain-
tiff cannot have the benefit of 'the limitation 
contained in the Act of 1867 because he did 
not base his cause of action upon the alleged 
fraud, but upon the promissory note, making 
no allusion to the fraud in his complaint. rt 
is no't provided that no cause of action for 
fraud shal'l be discharged, but that no debt 
created by fraud shall be discharged. These 
promisory notes were deb'ts of the defendants 
and the plaintiff was induced by the fraud 
of the defendants to sell goods to them an·d to 
1take their notes therefore and hence these 
debts were created by their fraud wfthin the 
meaning of the bankruptcy act. It is not need-
ful that 'the plaintiff should allege the fraud 
in h'is complaint, it was no part of his cause 
of action. It was needful only for him to prove 
tha't not as a part of his cause of action, but 
as an answer to the affirmative defense set 
up * * *. The claimant may sue, on contract 
and if the discharge in bankruptcy is pleaded, 
he may, in rebuttal, show that the debt was 
created by fraud, not to change his cause of 
action from contract to frau·d, but to prevent 
its being disbarred by the discharge in bank-
ruptcy." 
In Personal Finance vs. Martinez 115 Fed. 2nd 
12 
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226 (lOth Circuit) -a carefu1 reading of this case 
and a elementary mathematical computation will 
show the liability was co-extensive with the terms 
of the contract. This case shows a loan of $110.00 
was made on April 5, 1939; a suit was filed October 
18, 1939 for $150~00. This was allowed in the lOth 
Circuit Court and this ease has never been overruled 
and from an easy computation, it can be seen the 
only way this liability could go from $110.00 to 
$150.00 in that period of time would be to allow the 
provisions of the contract to apply. In this case the 
court allowed recovery tlnder the terms of the note 
and the false pretense and false representations 
avoided the defense of bankruptcy. 
In Blackman vs. McAdams 11 S.W. 599, we 
find: 
'"fhis was an action on a promissory note 
executed by defendant to plaintiff. The peti-
tion was an ordinary declaration on a note. 
The answer set up defendant's discharge in 
bankruptcy in the prop·er United States Dis-
trict Court. Plaintiff filed a reply to the 
answer in which he alleged the note was a 1li-
ability arising by reason of defendants false 
pretense and false representations.'' 
''The first point made is that the matter 
alleged in the reply should have been set up 
in the petition. We think not. The answer set 
up new matter in alleging defendant's dis-
charge from the debt in bankruptcy. It was 
then proper to plead, by way of reply, such 
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In the case of Personal Industrial Loan Corpor-
ation vs. K~enneth Dixon Forgay 140 Fed. Sup. 473 
- Judge Ritter made several observations, among 
them stating the case overruled the Martinez case 
which I have discussed above, these observations 
were corrected by the lOth Circuit Court decision 
in 'the same case foun·d in 230 Fed. 2nd 18. There 
the court did not criticize the pleading of a note 
liability, but held that no facts had been alleged to 
show the liability was founded on false pretenses 
and false representations. There can be no doub't 
that if the allegations on the false pretense and fa'lse 
representations had been made to show the actual 
facts rather than conclusions, a recovery would have 
been allowed on the no'te. I quote 
"It is elementary 'that fraud must be al-
leged by distinctly ple'ading the facts consti-
tuting the fraud. Mere epithets or conclusions 
or general charges * * * are not good unless 
ac-companied with a statement of the facts 
to sustain it * * * it is necessary to show not 
on1y what the fraud was and that injury has 
been sustained, but also the connection of the 
fraud with the alleged damage, so that it may 
appear * * * whether the one might have re-
sulted directly from tl1e dther. No facts were 
pleaded which if admitted or es1tablished 
would support a frau·d judgment." 
Collier on Bankruptcy 13 Ed. 616 
"In a suit on a note, if the defendant 
pleads a discharge in bankruptcy, the plain-
tiff may set up fraud in his reply". 
14 
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Personal Finance Company of Providence vs. 
Nichols 43 Atlantic 2nd 314-
"A debt created by fraud is not void but 
voidable only and therefore a creditor may 
assert both the debt and the fraud at the same 
time so long as he asserts the fraud to avoid 
not the debt but the discharge". 
The bankruptcy act does not ·create some new 
or different liability to the creditor, but only fur-
nishes the bankrupt with a defense to the enforce-
ment. When the defense is overcome by showing 
false pretenses and false representations, the liabi-
lity continues unaffected by the diseharge in bank-
ruptcy. It was never intended that the doctrine of 
election of remedies should be invoked to preclude 
the introduetion of proof to counter a special de-
fense. 
In an annotation found in 133 A.L.R. 466, is 
the following quotation: 
"The defendant's position is, in effect, 
that when the declaration is on a contract of 
sa1le and the plea is discharge in bankruptcy, 
the replication of debt created by defendant's 
fraud is bad, that an isue upon a traverse of 
such replications is an immaterial issue and 
a trial of such an issue, a mistrial * * * the 
plaintiff declares upon a promise of defen-
dants to pay for goods sold, an'd, if he main-
tains his action, he m'aintains it upon the con-
tract of sale affirmed by him. When a party 
has an election between two inconsistent rights 
or remedies - for instance, when he can rely 
15 
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upon a contract, or renounce the contract 
and rely upon fraud - and he has knowledge 
of all facts material to be known in making 
a choice, his selection of one may be renuncia-
tion of the other, but the plaintiff in this 
case avers the fraud of the defendants, not as 
the p1l'aintiff's cause of action, but as a refu-
tation of the defendants' alleged defense of 
discharge. The plaintiff claims to recover 
damage not for the defendant's fraud but for 
the breach of his promise to pay for the good 
bought, and in the replication, he alleges the 
fraud, not as a ground upon which his action 
rests, but to show there is no ground on which 
the defendants discharge can be applied to 
this debt * * * The statute recognizes the 
debt created by the fraud of the bankrupt is 
a debt not discharged and not affec'te,d by the 
proceedings of bankruptcy, except so far as it 
nTay be paid by .a dividend. So far as this 
case is concerned, the debt, if created by the 
fraud of the bankrupt, is excepted out of the 
operation of the bankruptcy act. And when 
the plaintiff answers the plea of discharge 
by the replication of debt created by fraud, 
he does not attempt to rescind or invalidate 
or renounce the contract, bu't he affirms it, 
and claims that the debt is a valid subsisting 
debt. In the declaration he asserts the debt. 
In the replication he asserts the same debt. 
He avers the fraud, not to avoid the contract 
himself, but to show that the defendant can-
not avoid it; no't to show that by reason of 
the fraud, the debt declared upon was never 
created, but to show that being- created by 
fraud, it was not discharged under the bank-
ruptcy act; no't to show that there is no such 
debt, but to show that there is such a debt 
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notwithstanding the discharge. In this course 
there is no inconsistency and the plaintiff is 
not estopped to answer the plea of discharge 
by the replication of debt created by fraud". 
P'OINT II 
THE EFFECT OF THE DISCHARGE IN BANK-
RUPTCY IS DETERMINED IN THE FORUM WHERE 
THE QUESTION ARISES. 
This prob1em I believe has been adequately 
settled for many years. However, until very recent-
ly there was one case that indicated an obligation 
rested upon a creditor who had knowledge of facts 
which would preclude a bankrupt from being dis-
charged, to advise the bankruptcy cour:t thereof; 
'that his failure to do so, would legally bar him from 
maintaining a subsequent sui!t against 'the bankrupt. 
In the case of Harold F. White vs. Pub\lic Loan Gorp-
oration, 147 Fed. Rep. 2nd 601, decided I believe 
in 1957, the court said: 
"The Referee has based his dec'ision upon 
the opinion and holding of Judge Reeves in 
the case of In re: Walton D.C.W.D. Missouri 
51 Fed. Sup. 857 - that case held, in a situ-
ation simillar to 'that here involved, that an 
obligation rested upon a creditor who had 
knowledge of any facts which would preclude 
a bankrupt from being discharged, to advise 
the bankruptcy court thereof, and on his fail-
ure to do so would legally bar h'im from main-
taining a subsequent suit against the bank-
rupt related to his claim. Page 858. The 
opinion further d~lared that the bankruptcy 
court would also be equitably entitled, as a 
17 
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mater of estoppel, to prevent such a creditor 
from harvesting the fruits of his bad faith 
scheme of allowing the debts of other credi-
tors to be discharged and of leaving himself 
with the advantage of being able to pursue 
the bankrupt alone. Page 859. 
'Hovv-ever desirable these results may 
seem abstractly in relation to a bankruptcy 
proceeding, we do not believe that the 'langu-
age of Section 14 and 17 of the Bankruptcy 
Act, 11 U.So Code Annotated Sec. 32 and 35, 
dealing with the granting of discharges and 
the effect thereof, admits of the application 
of any such qualifications or conditions. 
"On the specificnese and detail with 
vvhich Congress took pains to cover the grant-
ing of discharges under Section 17, we can 
see no room for any implication that a credi-
tor was to have a legal duty to advise the 
bankruptcy court of any information he might 
have which would preclude the bankrupt from 
being discharged - much less for any infer-
ence of a legislative intent that, if he failed 
to do so, he should be subject to the penalty 
in relation to Section 14, of not being able 
to maintain a suit against the ba11krupt upon 
any debt he might have \vhich was excepted 
from the operation of a discharge by Sec-
tion 17. 
"No more is there any room to append 
such qua'lifications and conditions and penalty 
to Section 17 itself. The exceptions provided 
for in Section 17, such as liabilities for ob-
taining money or property by false pretenses 
or false representations, are rights which Con-
gress has chosen to exempt from bankruptcy 
administration and consequences and to leave 
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standing infavor of creditors, the same as they 
were before the bankruptcy proceedings. The 
exemption is self executing and no decree of 
the bankruptcy court is needed or is able to 
give it establishment. 
"We therefore think the Walton case is 
wrong in its holdings that a bankruptcy court 
is entitled to deprive a creditor of the benefit 
of the excemption existing under Section 17, 
on the basis of his having failed to file ob-
jection, or to communicate information to the 
court, in relation to the bankrupt's discharge. 
In this connection it may be noted that no 
other reported decisions appear o h·ave follow-
ed the Wa'lton case. As one bankruptcy text 
book authority has commented 'The decision 
has absolutely no statutory basis to support 
it and must be regarded as erroneous'. I Col-
lier on Bankruptcy 14th Ed. Section 14-07 
footnote 4, page 12'72." 
POINT III 
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY THE DEFENDANT 
DO NOT JUSTIFY OR SUSTAIN HIS P'OSITION. 
The authorities cited by the defendant do not 
justify or sustain his position. The case ci'ted by de-
fendant, Personal Loan Co. vs. Forgay, decided by 
District Judge Ritter in 140 Fed. Sup. 417, and by 
the lOth Circuit Court in 230 Fed. 2nd 18, was a 
case in a non-record court by default judgment with-
out any indication or proof of false pretenses or 
false representations. The complaint alleged only a 
conclusion and the court held no false pretenses or 
false representations had been pleaded or proved, 
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and there were no Findings of Fact or Conclusions 
of Law 'to indicate evidence had ever been taken in 
that respect. We find in the decision of the Circuit 
Court, the following: 
''The power to enjoin proceedings in a 
state court involving a debt listed in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding or a judgment obtained on 
such a debt in a state court during bankruptcy 
proceedings or thereafter, is not an absolute 
power and may be exercised only under such 
condtions as appeal to the equitable conscience 
of the court. 
"A due regard to our dual system of court 
requires a Federal Court to conclude that had 
the debtor presented his defense that the debt 
sued on in the state court was in fact dis-
chargeable, the state court would have given 
it the consideration it merited, or that if the 
defense vvas offered and rejected by the state 
court, that it acted in good faith and that 
therefore the judgment was entitled to full 
faith and credit * * * the default judgment it 
obtained is merely for the amount of the clain1 
and did not purport to be a fraud judgment. 
~n fact the judgment did 11ot refer to fraud 
In any way. 
"Mere epithets, or conclusions, or genera'l 
charges, are not good u11less accompanied with 
a statement of facts to sustain it * * * it is 
necessary to show not only what the fraud was 
and that injury has been sustained, but also 
the connection of the fraud with the alleged 
damage, so that it may appear whether one 
might have resulted from the other. No facts 
were pleaded which if admitted or established 
would support a fraud judgment." 
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In the case of Beneficial L·oan Company vs. 
Noble 129 Fed. 2nd 425; the Federal Court held that 
federal courts would recognize the decisions and 
judgments of the state cou~t. We find the following 
quotation: 
"A default judgment was entered, debtor 
had consulted legal aid and was told to dis-
regard the suit. On the hearing of the Order 
to Show Cause (Why plaintiff should not be 
enjoined) the referee found that 110 fraud was 
practiced on the loan company when the second 
loan was obtained, that the loan company did 
not rely on the financial statement given when 
the second loan was made * * * 
"Here however, the bankruptcy court did 
not undertake to exercise its juriS'diction with 
respect to allowance, rejection, or subordina-
tion of a claim, but undertook to inquire into 
'the meri'ts of the cause of action for fraud 
upon which the state court's good judgment 
was predicated. The decision of the referee 
is therefore reversed. 
In the case of Household FiThance Corporation 
vs. Dunbar 262 Fed. 2nd 212; this case held that 
the defendant waived the defense of bankruptcy by 
failing to defend. On page 116 of the decision, we 
find: 
"Here Dunbar had 70 days within which 
to set up the order of discharge as a defense 
in the state court action. He failed to do so 
and permitted judgment to go against him 
by default. We reluctantly conclude that Dun-
bar waived his defense to the state court ac-
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tion and was not entitled to equitable relief 
in the federal court''. 
The quotation by defendant from this case is 
dicta. The case does not deal in detail with the plead-
ings on the point covered in the quotation, there 
appears to l1ave been no briefing on this point either 
by the court or the counsel, nor a complete consider-
ation of the statement. It was a gratuitous state-
ment and not necessary to or part of the decision and 
therefore the case does no't decide the point for 
which defendant quoted it. In fact I have found no 
case, either in the defendant's brief or out, that 
has decided the point in favor of the defendant's 
position. 
The case of State Finance vs. Morrow 216 Fed. 
Rep. 2nd 676 does not sustain the position of de-
fendant. We find in the case: 
"As a practical matter based upon the 
realities of the judicial processes in a court 
in which the issues are loosely passed, the 
bankruptcy court is unab1e to determine with 
any degree of satisfaction, whether the ulti-
mate judgment of the court will be based upon 
the debt for which the note was given or the 
fraud which may have induced it. The coutt 
n1ay well have 'taken judicial notice that the 
court in which the liability was asserted was 
not a court of record where issues of law and 
fact are defined with any degree of particu-
larity and that for all practical purposes the 
bankrupt is defenseless~ It is these practical 
considera'tions which prompt the bankruptcy 
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courts to exercise their equitable powers. In-
deed, it is these considerations which impose 
upon them the inescapable duty to vouchsafe 
the integrity of their decrees. The trial court 
determined the adequacy of the remedy upon 
the face of the complaint and concluded that 
the appellants suit was upon the discharged 
debt. We think the court was fully justified 
in so doing * * * It will thus be seen the 
'la'tter section ( * * * Section 17 subdivision a) 
excepts liabilities for false pretenses and false 
representations from discharge. Section 14, 
subdivisionc 3 authorizes the withholding of 
a discharge in its entirety on the grounds of 
fraud. The two sections are not mutually ex-
clusive or paria materia, but they have been 
construed and administered to provide for 
an expedicious discharge of all provable debts 
and to leave the effect of a discharge to litiga-
tion in courts of competent jurisdiction where 
the decree of discharge is pleaded as a defense 
to a claim based upon liability ob'tained by 
fraud and false pretenses * * * In short the 
right to a discharge and the effeet of a dis-
charge are entire1ly distinct propositions * * *. 
The trial court's injunctive decree is based 
squarely upon the philosophy of Local Loan 
vs. Hunt 2·93 U. S. 2'34- 54 Sup. Ct. 695; and 
Seaboard Finance vs. Ottinger 50 Fed. 2nd 
856, at page 680. 
The fact that the face of the complaint did not 
se't forth facts showing that the debt was founded 
upon or was induced by false pretenses and false 
representations, was the controlling factor. 
I do not believe the case of Kin near et al vs. 
Pro~~se .et al; 16 Pac. 2nd 1094- 81 Utah 135, is in 
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point or is of any help in this case because the 
points there discussed are not involved in 'the pre-
sent case. The distinction between the instant case 
before 'the court and the Kinnear case was amply 
set forth in the annotation quoted above in 133 
A.L.R. 466. It was never intended that the doctrine 
of election of remedy should be invoked to preclude 
the introduction of proof to counter a specia'l defense. 
One other thing, if intention to deceive or con-
ceal is necessary it is well established that this in-
tend is supplied by 'the making of statements which 
are knowingly fals.e or made with a reckless indif-
ference to their truth or falsity. The burden is on 
the bankrupt 'to prove that he has not given a ma-
terially false statement within the meaning of the 
Bankruptcy Act where a cre'ditor has sho\vn reason-
able grounds for believing tha't he has. 
In Third National Bank vs. Smatlock, 99 Fed. 
2nd 687, Page 689 
"Where the objector has shown to the 
satisfaction of the court 'reasonable grounds 
for believing' the burden then shifts to the 
bankrupt to prove that he has not committed 
the acts charged". 
In the instant case it has been admitted the 
defendant made a materia~ly false statement in-
writing; tha't he knew it was false and that the 
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plaintiff relied on the statement and that the plain-
tiff believed it to be true, and would have conducted 
himself differently if he had known the true fac'ts. 
The plaintiff submits the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court was proper and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BARTLETT R. PARKINSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
502 Phillips Petroleum Bldg. 
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